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1. Prototypical CNs and MNs
All natural languages seem to distinguish at the semantic level between count nouns (CNs) and
mass nouns (MNs). Some natural languages, like English, mark the distinction at the syntactic
level. Prototypical ofCns is "dog" and of MNs is "matter" (in the sense of physical stulf). One
syntactic difference is that CNs take the plural ('dogs') whereas MNs do not. Other syntactic dis¬
tinctions relate to the determiners and quantifiers. One can say a dog, another dog, many dogs, two
dogs, etc.; one cannot correctly say *a matter, *another matter, *manymatter, *two matter, etc.
It seems that the distinction in English grammar was introduced by Jespersen (1924, p. 198).
Languages differ in morphology, agreement rules and phrase structure, so one does not
expect to find in every natural languages a count/mass distinction with the same linguistic
correlates as in English. While many European languages are like English in this connection,
not all are. Irish and Latin, for example, lack the ¡definite article, and so one cannot distinti-
guish CNs from MNs in those languages by the possibility or impossibility of adding the inde¬
finite article to the noun. If we inquire what guides linguists to the decision that there are a
count/ mass distinction in languages, the answer cannot simply be grammar. Grammar varies
greatly from language to language. Something other than grammar must be contributing to the
decision. We submit that the type of reference for prototypical words plays a major role. We
think that across variations in grammar there is a semantic uniformity in the interpretation of at
least such prototypical nouns as the counterparts of dog and matter and that this semantic uni¬
formity is a good guide to the relevant grammatical facts in each language. We propose to
exploit the semantic uniformity as far as possible.
This should not be taken as an assumption that the perceptual experience of a noun's
extension determines whether a noun applied to it is count or mass. It cleary does not. The very
same perceptual expercience that licenses the application of the MN gravel licenses that of the
CN pebble. Moreover languages vary in what they choose to present in the first instance as
mass and what as count. French speakers, for example, apply the CN meuble where English
speakers would normally apply the MN furniture. Notice that furniture does supply natural
units, or as we say articles of furniture (chairs, tables, lamps, etc.). The importance of the proto¬
typical examples also shows up in work on child language learning. Young children tend to take
a new word taught them for a stuff that is like sand in its consistency as a MN, and a word for
unfamiliar creatures reminescent of animals as a CN (see especially McPherson [1991] and
Soja et al [1991]).
Pelletier and Schubert [1989] document the difficulty in deciding what precisely falls
under the classifications mass or count: noun phrases, adjectives and adjectival phrases, verbs
and verb phrases, or adverbs and adverbial phrases? Even if one could settle on the relevant
* John Macnamara died on January the 12th, 1996.
155
syntactic category or categories, there is still the issue of what precisely in those categories is
mass or count: the expressions themselves, their senses, or their occurrences? All this in addi¬
tion to the problem of how to decide whether something, whatever that something is, is mass
rather than count. But notice that to start work on these questions assumes that we understand
the mass/count distinction. On the basis of the prototypical examples discussed above, we take the
view that this distinction applies to nouns, whether or not it applies to other grammatical cate¬
gories. Our work is concerned only with the mass/count distinction for nouns, whose solution
is presupposed in formulating some of the previous questions. Despite their obvious interest,
those questions we do not propose to tackle.
2. Cumulative and distributive reference
The usual way of distinguishing MNs from CNs is by specifying semantical properties that
MNs have but CNs lack.
Two or more dogs do not together constitute a larger dog; whereas two or more quantities
ofmatter together constitute a larger quantity ofmatter. It is customaiy, following Quine [1960,
p9l], to refer to this property of the extension of MNs as cumulative reference. Likewise, a
(proper) part of a dog is not a smaller dog, whereas a part of matter is matter in the sense that
a part of a portion ofmatter is a smaller portion of matter. Many writers refer to this semantic
property of MNs as distributed (or divided or divise or homegeneous) reference. All the aut¬
hors that we have consulted accept the cumulative reference (as we do) but the property ofdivi-
siveness of reference divides them!
What is our position in this debate? In fact, if in accordance with the test of cumulative
reference we interpret a MN as a sup-lattice M, then it makes no sense to ask wheter apart of
an element of M is again an element ofM. What could be a part over and above the elements
ofm? We believe that this discussion presupposes (perhaps inadvertently) a universal substance
S, a sup-lattice containing every interpretation of a MN as a sub su-lattice. Whit such a sub¬
stance it makes sense to ask whether every element of S which is a part of an element ofM is
an element of M. We reject the notion of a univesal substance, however, and so we are led to
reject the whole debate as meaningless. This position, however, seems to go too far: take for
instance the MN 'footwear'. It applies to a shoe ant to any collection of shoes, but does not
apply to a proper part of a shoe. A shoe's heal is certainly not footwear and a leg of a table is
not furniture. Thus, there is a truth of the matter whether a part of a shoe is a shoe and a part
of a table is a table. All of this seems perfectly meaningful and such knowledge is assumed in
the everyday use of the language. Indeed, we introduce a notion of substance relative to a sys¬
tem of interpretations of nouns (like 'heal' and 'leg') and these questions will in fact become
meanigful. The answer will depend of course on the system of interpretations considered. For
more details including mathematical developments see La Palme Reyes et al [to appear].
Notice that a related, although different question may be formulated meaningfully without
invoking a universal substance: is the sup-lattice M atom-less? This is so because the notion of
an atom (or primitive element) is definable in any sup-lattice. We belive that these two ques¬
tions have sometimes been confounded, and this has obscured the fact that the first can be for¬
mulated only if a universal notion of substance is assumed. At any rate, under the assumption
of a universal substance, divisiveness of reference implies that the extensions ofMNs are alom-
Iees. This is the only issue that we will address at this point.
Several authors, terMeulen [1980], [1981], Roeper [1983], Lonning [1987], Bunt [1985],
among others, have erected divisiveness or reference into a characteristic ofMNs. Bunt [1985,
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pp. 45-46], for example, allows that in the actual physical extensions ofmany MNs there are
minimal parts, but dismisses the fact as linguistically irrelevant. Quine [1960], Parsons [1970],
Gillon [1992] and others reject this claim for the reason that we formulate as follows. It may
well be that for many centuries users of the English word water did not realice that there are
minimal portions ofwater, namely molecules, whose parts are not water. (Notice how both pro¬
blems are here confound). The effective use of the word does not depend on knowledge of that
scientific fact. This seems to have lead some writers to the conclusion that the facts of the mat¬
ter have no beaning on the extensions of common nouns. But extension is extension, indepen¬
dent of our knowledge. There is a truth of the matter that there are minimal parts in extensions
of some MNs at least: witness the examples of 'footwear' and 'funiture' already discussed.
Thus, we do not see reasons to set limitations a priori to extensions of MNs. Furthermore,
excluding atomic extensions would rule out the possibility of considering plurals as MNs. Not
only there is linguistic evidence to do so, discussed by Carlson and Link (see below), but we
will see that the plural construction may be viewed as a basic link between CNs and MNs.
3. Categories of nouns and their interpretations
One of the main novelties of our approach is to take into account the connections beween MNs,
the connections between CNs and the ways that MNs can be transformed into CNs and vice-
versa. For instance, there is a connection between the MN iron and the MN metal described in
colloquial language by the sentence iron is metal, analogous to that between dog and animal
that we studied in La Palme Reyes et al [1994b]. Furthermore, there must be some way of con¬
necting the MN metal and the CN a metal to validate some arguments involving both expres¬
sions. This net of connections may be organized in an objective way by means of system of
categories and functors: the nominal theory. This system includes the category CN whose
objects are CNs and whose morphisms are axioms of the form 'a dog is a mammal', "a mam¬
mal is an animal' which may be thought of as a system of identifications. By composing those
axioms we obtain the new identifications 'a dog is an animal'. In a similar vein, the nominal
theory includes the category MN of MNs such as 'iron', "metal' and whose morphisms are
axioms such as 'iron is metal'. The transformations mentioned before between CNs and MNs
are described by functors. One example is the plural formation that takes the CN 'dog' into
"dogs'. Since the extension of this term obviously has property of cumulative reference, we
categorize "dogs' as a MN. Carlson [1977] and then Link [1981] called attention to the affinity
between plurals and MNs. In fact this affinity even extends to the syntax of both expressions.
As an example, plural CNs just like MNs do not take the plural. Also on a par with MNs, such
combinations as *a dogs *another dogs are ungrammatical.
The categories CN and MN are unified by means of a third, ON, the category of quanti¬
tative nouns (QNs) which includes as objects the previous ones but also some native objects of
its own. These we have not seen so categorized in the literature. Examples of such native QN's
(besides collectives), are steak, clotli, paper, drink, stone, space, time, etc. To see what is dis¬
tinctive of Qns, consider the phrase a space as applied for example to a room.
The room is a space which can be divided in two by, say, the diagonal joining two oppo¬
site corners. The room is thus the sup of these subspaces. But a square meter in one of the cor¬
ners together with a square meter in the other corner do not together make a single space. It
seems that to form a single space, subspaces must be contiguous. Thus, a space is not a MN
phrase, since arbitrary subspace do not have a sup. On the other hand, it is not a CN phrase ei¬
ther, since a space may have another space as a proper part. The reader is invited to make a simi-
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lar analysis for a rope. An example of a different kind seems to be the following, related to the
noun committee. We may have one committee C having exactly two subcommittees A and B.
To discuss reports from these subcommittees, a committee of the whole C' is created. This new
committee differs from C because the minutes will record all the transactions of C but omit
those of C'. This shows that conceptually, C' is different from C. We regard C and C' as "for¬
mal' sups ofA and B, a notion to be clarified in a forthcoming paper Besides these examples
there are others such as quantity ofmatter which are important when dealing with functors
among the categories of the nominal theory.
We interpret the nominal theory as follows: CNs are interpreted as situated sets (or kinds),
namely, families ofsubsets of a given set indexed by situations. A subset indexed by a situation
consists of all the members of the given set which are constituent of that situation. Situations
are assumed to be pre-ordered by the relation of'having more information' (not to be confused
with temporal order), and hence there are obvious connections between the subsets of the
family. Morphisms between CNs are interpreted as situated maps, i.e., set-theoretical maps pre¬
serving the relation of constituents of a situation into members of another set which are cons¬
tituents of the same situation. Such maps we call underlying. MNs are interpreted as situated
sup-lattices and morphisms as sup preserving situated maps. Finally, QNs are interpreted as
situated sup-sketches, i.e., situated sets with a partial order relation and a set of distinguished
formal "sups'. Morphisms between QNs are interpreted as situated maps which preserve the
distinguished 'sups'. Functors of the nominal theory are interpreted as functors of the corres¬
ponding interpretations. For instance, formation of the plural is interpreted as (an enriched)
power set functor between CN and A/A'. A word about situations in our approach. We do not
attempt to develop a theory of situations along the lines of Barwise and Perry [1983]. Instead
we take situations as unanalyzed primitives requiring only of them that they be sufficient to
ground the truth or falsehood of certain sentences, a completely intuitive notion. Such situa¬
tions differ from possible worlds in that they need not ground the truth or falsehood of all sen¬
tences; only the sentences that may interest us.
For a more thorough philosophical discussion of the notion of situated set or kind the
reader is referred to La Palme Reyes et al [1994 a]. We will only remark that it is a consequence
of our approach that the underlying maps among kinds are not set-theoretic inclusions that are
everywhere assumed in the literature. Such an inclusion assumes identity between, for exam¬
ple, a pup and the associated dog. Some underlying maps are not even injective. For example,
an airline may count several passengers in association with a single person, it that person takes
several trips with them.
4. Grammatical transformations and syllogisms
The nominal theory and its interpretation is used to decide the validity of syllogisms of the type
discussed by Pelletier and Schubert [1989] and involving CNs MNs and predicables. To achieve
this purpose, we need to build semantical counterparts to grammatical transformations of CNs
into MNs, MNs into predicables and so on, extending our previous work La Palme Reyes et al
[1994 b]. As an example, consider the syllogisms.
Claret is a wine, wine is a liquid, so claret is liquid.
In the first premise, 'claret' is a NP (as in the first) and 'is liquid' is a VP. The NPs in this
example are, however, like PNs (proper names) or descriptions. Cross linguistic evidence sug¬
gests that 'claret' is not a PN. In fact, in French, one uses the expression 'le bordeaux' and
French does not allow the definite article in front of a PN. This suggests to categorize 'claret'
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as a descriptive noun phrase (DNP), i.e., as a noun phrase whose interpretation is a member of
a kind. As in the paper cited above, we consider "is a wine' as a predicable derived from the
term "wine', a CN as indicated by the occurrence of'a'. The second premise can be analyzed
in a similar way. On the other hand, we will assume that 'is liquid' in the conclusion is a pre¬
dicable derived from the term 'liquid', an Mn as indicated by the absence of "a'.
At the level of interpretation, these grammatical transformations (or derivations) will take
us into computations of colimits of interpretations in our categories to define notions of rela¬
tive entity, relative substance, etc.
5. Category theory versus set theory
A final word about the use of category theory (rather than set theory) in our work. (For a more
thorough discussion, see Magnan and Reyes [1994]). A first observation concerns generality:
sets themselves constitute a particular category. The use of category theory allows us to formu¬
late semantics that are free of the particular determinations imposed by a too rigid adherence to
set theory. From this point of view, we would like to emphasize that the semantics introduced in
our paper is one among several possible ones. The fundamental property of the category that
interprets CNs is to a be a category ofspace; while the fundamental property of that which inter¬
prets MNs is to a be a category ofquantity, in the terminology of Lawvere [1992],
A second observation concerns abstractness. Contrary to a widespread belief sel-theore-
tic semantics are more abstract than category-theoretic ones. This is easily understood when we
compare usual set-theoretic semantics of CNs and MNs with our category-theoretic semantic.
As we pointed out one of the main novelties of our approach is to take as the basic ingredients
of our semantics the connection between dogs and animals, iron and metal, wines and wine,
chicken and food, golden ring and gold, etc. These connections guided the choice of the cate¬
gories used to interpret CNs, MNs and QNs.
To give an example, any sup-lattice is also an inf-lattice and thus, from a set-theoretical
point of view, it makes no difference whether to work with sup-lattices or inf-lattices. On the
other hand, morphisms of sup-lattices are quite different from rnorphisms of inf-lattices and
the following example shows that underlying relations do not preserve the intersection in gene¬
ral: take a person who has traveled twice, say, and consider the underlying map u at the level of
sets of persons (which are sup-lattices as well as inf-lattices) which associates with a set of pas¬
sengers the underlying set of persons. Clearly u preserves arbitrary unions. On the other hand, u
does not preserve binary intersection: letp, p' be the two passengers whose underlying person is
John. Then if we take the intersection of the subset whose only element \sp (P) with the subset
whose only elements is p ' (P'), we obtain the empty set and hence the image of this intersection
by u is still the empty set. But if we intersect u (P) and u (P') we obtain the subset w hose only
element is John. Other examples of this kind can be given to justify our choice of categories.
From this point of view, the trouble with set-theoretical semantics is simply this: they are
too abstract, since they abstract away these fundamental relations, which are therefore not pro¬
perly represented (in these semantics). As a consequence, set-theoretical constructions are not
contrained in a natural way: they are just too many and when a choice is required, extraneous
principles, usually of a pragmatic nature, are brought in to decide the issue. On the other hand,
categorical constructions are highly constrained through the use of universal properties: among
all possible constructions one is distinguished as satisfying a universal property. Because of this
feature, it has been argued that the theory of categories constitutes a theory of concrete univer¬
sals, set theory being rather a theory of abstract universals (see Ellerman [1988] ). This explains
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the ubiquity of universal constructions in our work. In a more speculative way, we are tempted
to believe that universal constructions may capture what is universal in the human mind includ¬
ing what is fundamental in human language.
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